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INTERVIEW WITH EDWARD G. LANSDALE
November 19, 1982

INTERVIEWERS:
PLACE:

William Gibbons, Patricia McAdams
McLean, Virginia

William Gibbons:

First of all, when did you first go to Vietnam?
Was it with General O'Danie l or had you gone previou sly?
Edward Lansdale :

I went with General J. W. O'Danie l on his White
House mission in 1953.
It was just by chance.
O'Danie l and his group had
come by the Philippi nes and stopped off at Clark Field overnigh t on the way
out to Saigon. O'Danie l asked me a lot of question s about the Huks that we
were fighting in the Philippi nes, the problems of fighting guerrill as and
guerrill a warfare types of actions.
And as I talked to him he said, "Would
you like to come with us out to Indochin a and see one there?"
I said, "I
would very much like to," and I said, "When are you leaving? "
He said,
"Wheels up at six in the morning ." This was about 10 or 11 at night and I
said, "All right~"
I thought he said they were going to be there for five
days, or somethin g like that.
Instead of that, we went over there for four
weeks. I had to free myself for that, since I was right in the middle of all
sorts of things in the Philippi nes. When we got to Saigon, the French were
surprise ~, were appalled r~ally, that I was there.
Some of their diploma ts
and politica l people had been over to visit in the Philippi nes to see the Huk
fighting , and I knew them. Politici ans in that part of the world were scared
of me.
They feared I was going to bring democrac y with me, change their
governm ents. Some French felt very much that way, apparen tly. And they put
up a real scream to our mission and to O'Danie l, but General Navarre was just
taking over command then, and Navarre said, "No, I welcome someone like him
being here."
He gave us a lunch the day after we got there -- all of the
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brass attended -- and he asked me, he said, "You know, I'm coming up with a
new plan for our forces, and," he said, "I would value any of your notes and
ideas on fighting the Viet Minh guerrillas here." He added, "Would you help
me with the supplementary parts of my plan on intelligence, psychological
warfare, and clandestine operations, and so on?" So, that's what I did while
I was there. He wrote out his personal orders to me to show to the commanders
around, so I had a very rare view of the war from the French side.
I even saw some of their clandestine operations.
They were edgy
because it was the SCEDE [the French CIA] operating there. I asked the SCEDE p1 ~ ~ :5 DE<:e-J
about its relations with the top command setup here in getting operational
support airlifts, and so forth. I pointed out that since I had the ear of the
top general for my visit, perhaps I could help them a little bit. "Come here,
we'll show you everything," they said. And they almost did. They showed me
the training and mounting of operations in very casual, relaxed brifings.
There was a lot of teasing back and forth.
I took a photograph of all of
their officers in the nude when they were swimming down at Cape St. Jacques,
where they had their camp; I had scrambled back to the beach, yelled at them,
got them all to come out of the water, and took some pictures. I told them
that I would give their pictures to the CIA in Saigon, which I did.
I'd
borrowed this camera.

It was a box brownie, a lousy camera.

whatever happened to the picture.

I don't know

[ laughter]

I also got in on French Army psychological operations, which were
very good up around Hanoi at the time; terrible elsewhere.
Their combat
intelligence suffered very badly there; very shallow and tardy in some of the
commands. I got_ flights up to the area near the China border and once saw the
convoys coming down from China, truck convoys, loaded with munitions and other
supplies~ I thought they were French. I asked the pilot, ''What the hell is
that down there?

You don't have any forces near that you're supporting." And
he said, "Oh, no, those are enemy supplies for the Communists." So I said,
"How the hell can they go along highways?"
them, interdict them, and stop them."

Why doesn't your air force bomb

And he said, "Hell, we can't.

have enough air power to do that."

We don't

It surprised me very much to see such open
support of the Viet Minh guerrilla forces from China.
Gibbons:

Did you know anything about Vietnam at that point?
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Lansdale :

I knew far too little before this visit. Mostly it was
what I had learned from reading the papers, from talks with America ns in
Manila who were visiting from our MAAG in Saigon, and from visits to the
Philippi nes by French ann Vietnam ese officia ls. But, I really knew too little
about the country and its people,
Next January, I was home and was asked to attend a meeting in the
Pentagon , a policy affair at which John Foster Dulles, the Secretar y of
Defense , and other official s were present.
It was about Indo-Ch ina, French
requests for aircraf t, Dien Bien Phu, and so on.
I was sitting with Philip
Bonsal, who was the Assistan t Secretar y of State for the Far East at the time,
and John Foster Dulles, just as he was talking, turned around and said, "We're
going to send you over there, Ed." [laughte r] I was just sitting there, you
know, so I said, "I'm not going over there.
Hell, it's the goddamn French
colons with their colony and •... " And he said, "Won't you go?"
And I said,
"Well, if it means helping the Vietnam ese, sure, but there's a lot I have to
learn about the place. I have to learn the language and read up on Vietnam ese
affairs. " He said, "Well, we want you to go over and help the Vietnam ese the
way you helped the Filipino s."
So I went and started French lessons.
But Magsays ay, who was then
Presiden t of the Philippi nes, was calling me at home and asking me to please
get back to Manila for a time.
He said he was having trouble with his
Congres s, particu larly the Senate, there, and since I knew all the Congress men
and Senators , would I please come back and work on relation s for him. I told
him, •~ell, I have other duties that are sort of pressing now, a differen t
country they want me to go to, and I have to learn a language and do a lot of
studying ."
My Dad was visiting me, at the time, and he said, "Who's that
fellow who keeps calling every night?" And I said, "Oh, some guy out in the
Philippi nes."
So, he didn't quite believe all that was going on.
Then the
phone rang a bit later -- right after my last turn-dow n, and after Magsays ay
talked to me about three or four times.
It was the Pentagon .
They said,
"Preside nt

Eisenhow er

just

got

a

call

from

Presiden t

Magsays ay

of

the
Philippi nes and he agreed that you 're going out to help him."
[laughte r]
"And you get out there promptly ."
So, as I was ordered out there, I was
begging them, I said, "Please don't cut orders for Vietnam until I get a

/
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chance to learn at least French," There was no Vietnames e language training
at the time. So I went back to the Philippin es.
They
finally,

for

ordered
some

me

reason,

from Manila over to
probably

due

to

the

Vietnam in a great hurry
impending

Conferenc e

at
They hurried me over there, and on my orders there was a phrase, "God
bless you" at the end [laughter ], instead of all the reference marks for
authorizi ng the flight and Vietnam duty. So, I bummed a ride with an Air-Sea
Rescue flight and went over to Vietnam and checked in, I learned that General
Geneva.

O'Daniel and Ambassado r Heath had both asked for me,
Secretary having said something .

too,

along with the

Gibbons:
You have described how you reacted to Diem's arrival -his inconspic uous entry into Saigon,
Lansdale:

Yes.

Gibbons:

And then you gave him your proposal for how he might
effective ly govern the country.
That's never been published , as far as I
know.
Lansdale:

I don't know what ever happened to it.

I don't know.

Gibbons:

It's been described , generally , in a couple of places, as
At that time, you still didn't know very much about Vietnam.

you know.

Lansdale:

No,

But I'd gotten around a lot and seen a lot. And I
still tried to understan d what I'd seen. The eye tells you something , but I
was always very conscious that I was a foreigner and that I had an American
backgroun d.

I kept trying to translate into what I knew, and some things just
wouldn't translate easily.
Gibbons:

Well, this is leading up to what I was going to ask you.
You didn't know very much, you were a foreigner . As you look back on it, do
you think you were making recommen dations to Diem that were made realistic ally
in the context of the Vietnames e culture?
Lansdale:

Yes, I do.

I didn't go into things that I wasn't firm
enough about. What I was recommending to him was what people were telling me
that they needed and I could see that they needed it.
They were wanting
certain things from their own governmen t and their own people, and this was

,
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prett y much what I was writin g about .
I tried to pass along to him.
Gibbo ns:

These were mostl y Vietn amese views that

I see.

I had thoug ht from your comment about how he might
have entere d Saigo n that you seemed to be apply ing
your own Weste rn value s,
polit ical value s, in a sense .
Lansd ale:

In talkin g to him later on, yes, I would very much.
I
was being mysel f, and I'd tell him, this is what we do
in my count ry. I don't
know about here, but try this, and see. Yet, certa in
value s are very basic to
human natur e.
I alway s realiz e the trues t words you get any place
, in any
count ry are from the farme r, the guy who is worki ng
with his own hands and
makin g his own living in the field . He has the trues
t views of polit ics and
every thing else -- nothi ng subtl e, it's alway s very
basic .
The Vietna mese
peasa nt or farme rs on both sides just wishe d both
polit ical sides would go
away and disap pear and leave them alone .
All throug h the war, they were
alway s that way. I used to go out and talk to them
as much as I could , just
to get their slant on thing s. And in my own mind, I
had alway s tried to see
beyon d what the very mater ial aspec ts of somet hing
were -- of housi ng and
archi tectu re and the way of life and the type of food
they eat and so on, to
get down below the surfa ce -- to get at the peopl e,
I've been very fortu nate
in havin g that urge to under stand , somehow or other ,
as part of my make- up,
and did that when I was in Vietna m becau se so much was
strang e looki ng to me.
Befor e Diem had arrive d, I had gone out with an offic
ial in the
Minis try of Socia l Justic e, visiti ng the sectio ns of
Saigo n and Cholo n where
the very poor and desti tute were living .
We were trying to help them help
thems elves, and organ ize them to do so.
The man in the gover nment who was
doing all that used to take me aroun d with him. He said,
"Is there somet hing
very diffe rent you can do to help in this organ izatio
n?" I said, "Yes, you
want me to teach the peopl e how to vote for who in their
community is going to
run the comm unity? " He said, that' s a great idea.
So I set up elect ions in
all of these wards in Saigo n and Cholo n.
Initia lly, the peopl e wante d to
know, "How do we swipe elect ricity from the city' s
power lines and simil ar
thing s," but we starte d them on progra ms for self-i mprov
emen t. I taugh t them
how to vote secre tly. They could n't read or write . I
showed them how to make
symbo ls for each candi date, let each candi date pick
a symbo l that the voter s
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could copy, and fold a piece of paper and put it in the ballot box.
The
French surrete and the authorities at the time got very worried at my going to
these places. They used to come in and say, "It's very dangerous being alone
with all of these people here."

And I said, "Oh, no, they are inviting me in
And the big crowds down in these communities got a

for tea," and so on.

terrific kick out of these elections.
invention since the wheel.

They thought that was the greatest.

And you could see these old guys with these wispy

beards and everything holding up a big cross or a circle or some fancy thing
that was his symbol, while each made an election speech. And then everybody
would vote.
City folks,

in turn,

would tell me about relatives out in the
provinces, and I'd go out with them for visits.
I started getting in close
with some of the religious sects and other groupings and political parties
around the country.

I was going through quite an education and I was quite
aware that I had an awful lot to learn yet. So, with a new Prime Minister

[Diem] coming in, I was very careful to try and reflect what the people had
said.
They had told me good and bad attitudes of their landlords. Some had
been in debt for generations due to the usury of the moneylenders. There were
a lot of things that were open to reforms.
A demand and no supply.

lacks.

there were fundamental

Strangely enough, I found out where people

were cold at night and needed blankets.
tropics.

Also,

Imagine that, down there near the

In some swampy areas they needed mosquito netting.

There were so

damned many big mosquitos around there, I'd swear that they could go in and
fly off with a water buffalo. [ laughter] You'd go into government warehouses
and see mosquito netting stacked in there and not being used. A government
leader would have to work on distributing such essentials to peopl e in need.
And th~re was another lack that was most evident. There was a great lack of
capable civil service people in government.
They weren't there. The French
were

running

things,

but

the French were

going

to pull out and weren't

training enough people to take their places.
Gibbons:

Yes.

Lansdale:

And the enemy, at least, were training their cadre to
come in and run the provinces and cities and towns.
Our side didn't have
enough of that.

There was just a great big vacuum there.

Somebody would have
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to start paying attention to that very soon and finding out some ways of
taking care of those things, particularly when at Geneva a pact had been
signed for, among other things, a plebesci te on who would take over the
country.

Well,

on our side,

there was a vacuum out in the countryside.
Except for some large cities, there were too few capable Vietnamese to take
care of things,

including organizing a vote, getting people to the polls,
encouraging a pro vote, or coping with the enemy's political moves.
There
were two million more people up in the northern side than in the south, so I
just figured the Communists could win the vote for easy, you know, controlling
their people down to the polling place and telling them how to vote, and on
our side there was disorganization .

That influenced my thinking on civil

service, as well as helping get the refugee program started. They were going
to bring down several thousand refugees.
I was always talking millions.
I
said,

"You've got to bring down at least one million to balance out the
population for the plebiscite and, then hopefully, we can get two million of
them down and have more down here to vote on our side, if we treat them
well." I was very mindful of the Palestinian refugees, and how badly that had
been handled, and I said, ''We can't keep these refugees in camp. We've got to
figure how to get them on the farms and fishing and into useful occupations
when they get down here and pick up their lives again, so we don't have to
keep on taking care of them forever in camp some place, which just leads to
political mischief eventually.
Gibbons:

Well, then you brought your team in, and did any of them
have any prior knowledge of Vietnam?
Lansdale:
was OSS.

One of them did. Lou Conein. He'd gone in in '45. He
He had come in out of China.
He had worked against the Viet Minh

and with the French.

He knew the French side of Indochina intimately and was
very sympathetic towards it. He didn't know the Vietnamese side as well. He
was the only one. I had some French speakers with me, but nobody at the time
spoke Vietnamese. They all learned quickly once they were in Vietnam.
Gibbons:

Do you think this was a handicap.
handicap to our country.
Lansdale:

Yes.

Obviously, it was a
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Gibbons:
Lansdale:

..• at that point and later.
Very much so, yes.
\

I think the big thing there was that

most Americans didn't even regard the Vietnamese -- whichever side they were
on -- as human beings, as fellow humans.
And that wasn't looking down or
denigrating them at all,

Vietnamese looked so different, so exotic, that when
you started talking about them from the American viewpoint you overlooked
their human traits.

I remember my first visit to the nationalist Lien Miuh G ic:..,,

guerrilla group.

I said, "These people remind me of the Green Mountain Boys
in our own Revolution.
They're from the boondocks and they're full of love
for their country." The Americans I talked to looked at me as if I was nuts
or something, you know, the look in their eye.

How can you talk that way?

It

used to sadden me that Americans didn't understand. And even later, with so
many Americans there, the Americans that really caught on were very far and
few between. They were there, and they were good people, but they were quite
rare.
I remember much later on in the war,

I was visiting a town just

south of Saigon, a Vietnamese regiment down there, and they had an American
Signal Corps sergeant advising them on communications.
He was a Sgt.
Valentine.
I remember his name.
I was with the Minister of Rural
Reconstruction, their pacification program.
to act decently towards the farmers there.
to build bunkers at the headquarters.

He was trying to get the troops
Troops were swiping farmer's roofs

And this sergeant said,

"That's an

important lesson he's teaching there," he said. "I've been in this war twice
now. I've come back to it again. We've got to learn to teach the Vietnamese
to love each other." He said, "People have to learn to love each other." Now
mind you, this is a sergeant speaking.

He was from New Mexico, but he was

originally a Puerto Rican; and from a very poor family.
He was killed that
night. I flew down the next day to see what had happened. I had heard there
had been an attack. I saw his body there and helped pick it up. I've always
remembered his remark to me.
Gibbons:

Do you think this cultural factor -- did we make any major
mistakes during the war as a result, let's say, of not understanding the
culture?

One of the things I'm thinking about is the way we kept pressing
Diem to do things that may not really have been possible in terms of the

Vietnamese culture.

M,~~
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Lansdale:

I think Diem, and the other leaders, once you sat down
with them and went over their problems carefully and listened hard, you could
always find out the things that they needed to do to help themselve s, to make
themselve s look good or win or whatever it was, which would be our aim also,
and get them to agree to it. It was really very simple. But we used to try
to force them bluntly to do things. It used to be sort of an extra medal or
kudo for an ambassado r, or whoever was trying to twist an arm, to get them to
do it. And I think that was quite wrong.
They more than understoo d, and I
always found them very easy to convince to do the right thing, for
themselve s. And also, in Asia there's a sense of humor, and I don't think we
always went in with a sense of humor to match it. One of the clues to getting
along was seeing what was funny, laughing at the right things, and also being
able to smile. The biggest passport in the world is a smile.
I

remember getting in an accident in Saigon once.
I hadn't been
alert enough and I started grinning sort of sheepishl y. A taxi cab had run
into me. The cab driver saw my face and he started grinning the same way. We
got out and shook hands.

He went off.

The American first secretary from the
"How did you do that?" And I said, "Do

embassy was with me, and he said,
what?"
He said, "You didn't even talk to the guy.
And you both seemed to
know something . What was it that you knew?" I said, ''We were both stupid and
we acknowled ged it by the way we looked and acted towards each other. We
parted amicably because there wasn't enough of a wreck, just a bump."
He
said, "Gee, I thought you'd be there arguing with him forever and a day."
Another time, the Marines took me to a village where they were doing
civic action, up in II Corps. We were going along a trail through the village
and the Marine corps general and his aides were marching ahead.
shouting· out "Chao ong," "Good Morning" in Vietnames e, to all the
But they were doing it in parade ground voices.
They'd take a
breath and shout out "Chao ong," and the people in this village

They were
villagers .
big, deep
you could

see them lined up in windows and doors -- were all taking big breaths and
shouting back "Chao ong."
I was walking right behind the general, watching
this, and I started laughing; the yelling back and forth was really sort of a
funny.

Seeing my grins, the villagers starting laughing, too. They came out
of their homes and joined us as we were walking up this path in the village.
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The genera l turned around and said, "What's up?" I said, "What do
you mean,
what's up?" He said, "All these people are with you back there and
you're all
laughin g.
Someth ing's real funny." I said, "No, no, no. We're just happy
about the way you' re using the langua ge."
sight; it was a very human thing.

[laugh ter]

But it was a funny

The blacks used to catch on, among the Americ an troops. You'd see
the blacks down with the kids playing , they'd be playing horsey in the
street
with the little kids riding them and they were down in the dirt and
rolling
with them and laughin g, and the people loved that. Some of our people
talked
about the black troops not being very good, but I said, "Gee,
I'm happy
they're here.
They're showing a real, good human side of America that these
people need."
Gibbon s:

You were talking about the fact that there seemed always
to be a gap between the feeling of those of you in Vietnam and the
people in
Washin gton. Was there also a problem from this cultura l standp oint.
Did you
get pushed by Washin gton more than you felt you should be, For exampl
e, did
they seem not to underst and certain things that they should have? Such
as how
to treat Diem, for exampl e.
Lansda le:

I didn't run across that problem directl y myself , But I
sort of did, second -hand. I used to see it in Washin gton, when I was
in the
Pentago n handlin g messag es going out to the Ambass ador. They would
tell him
to coerce Diem, give him ''do this or else" type of respon ses. Severa
l times,
I tried to get State to temper their languag e and let a senior ambass
ador be a
human being in his dealing s.
It's insulti ng, really, to talk that way, to a
head of state, an ally. Eviden tly, I didn't succeed , When dealing
with him
person ally, I usually got Diem to do things for his own good, and for
the good
of his people. And once he became convinc ed that it was for the good,
he'd go
ahead and do it.
That it was within U.S. policy to do so was only
incide ntal.
At times, Diem didn't underst and what was being asked of him.
Once, he asked me what a "chain of command" was in the militar y.
Genera l
O'Dani el had told him how necessa ry it was. I had to spell it out to
him, at
length. Anothe r time, German financ iers had talked of "floori ng" loans
and I
got an America n econom ist to explain it.
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Gibbons :
Collins
problems.
of Diem.

came

I

wanted to ask you about

the spring of 1955, after

back and you were still there and

there were all of these

The U.S. Government was on the verge of approving the replacement
In retro spect, do you think that that would have been a good idea at

that point?
Lansdale:

No.

I say no, not just because I was close to him. They
had been changing prime ministers from those that were very pro-French and
almost Frenchmen, to independent types, but there weren 't that many Vietnamese
to choose between at the time who would have any knowledge or experience at
all in running things

any executive ability.

Diem had his weaknesses on
executive ability, but everybody among the Vietnamese, even those who didn't
like him, admitted he was very honest and trying to do an honest job. So that
you'd always sort of excuse him when he'd do things a little wrong; at least
he was honest in trying to do things at that period. Not only that, but they
had just been through a real crisis. They were fighting the sects, and they
were trying to get themselves organized as a government.
It was no time to
change leaders.

I couldn't make anybody understand how fragile the government
was; they didn't have a civil service there.
We kept insisting that the
French should give them independence and let them run their own affairs, but
there weren't enough people to run their own affairs.
Gibbons:

Yes.

Lansdale:

There were a few top officials and a lot of greenhorns
down in the government who were sitting at desks and wondering what you did at
a desk. There were provinces to be governed, districts, and ministries. All
that Vietnam really had was an army that was organized in battalions, out in
the countryside,

and little else to be the government.
There were a few
postal and radio clerks, and a few others, but pretty scattered and not
trained, disciplined, and organized.
It was a time when we should have been
putting all of our strength and energies into teaching them how to govern
themselves. Instead of that we were always putting demands on them as though
they had a big, capable government. We wanted it run like Washington, but it
was a far cry from a developed country. I felt that they needed some years to
get ready for what the future held and here we were facing a Geneva-agreed
plebescite in two years, and they were a long way from being ready for such an
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election .

We were still bringing people down to the South from the North and
trying to get them settled in new homes and jobs. It was a real jumbled up
period. It was not a time to change a governm ent that was trying to cope with
all of these things. With the sect fighting that went on, it was the worst
damn thing that ever happened to a country -- to go through that type of a
minor civil war in the face of all of the outside problems and the other very
real interna l problems that existed there. Everybod y should have been helping
constru ct the country and helping its people. The whole social fabric of the
country had big gaps in it and it needed building up.
So, I was very much
opposed to just willfull y playing around a little bit with the structur e at
that time.
American official s would say, "Well, Diem's wrong."
I said,
"Well, tell me what it is and we'll see if it can be changed. It's very easy
to do.

Go and explain right from wrong."
But they wanted to insist on
demands .
I thought at the time that we were being very impatie nt,
politica lly. We weren't giving a chance for anything to settle in before we
tried to change it. Some of the things the Vietnam ese themselv es were trying
to do were wrong at the time, and they had to be restrain ed from hurting
themselv es -- includin g the forces fighting in there. Some of the French, I
know damn well, were egging them on. I used to be at the butt end of a lot of
that -- their enmity. I think they were hoping that I'd get killed off. It
was a time that the United States in its new role should have acted as the
greates t friend to those people.
A friend doesn't come in and say, "Hey,
you're doing that all wrong.
Gibbons:

Do it my way, or else I'm moving out."

Yes.

Well, after you left, between 1956 and 1961, do you
think we did right by them then?
Lansdale :

Not altogeth er.

Gibbons:

What didn't we do?

Lansdale :

Well, that's when we started getting very demandin g of
Diem and didn't take the time to persuade him, and we let some of the
politica l practice s grow up that afterwar ds became so harmful and ended up in
his getting killed.
We should have been better caretake rs of our role in
there, since we were in there in the role of their best friends and weren't
being. I remember I visited Vietnam in December of '60. There was going to
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be a Preside ntial election the next year, and there were rumors that Diem
was
going to put up a differen t person to run with him as Vice Preside nt in
place
of Nguyen Ngoc Tho.
I asked Diem about that and he said, well, his mind
wasn't made up yet.
He said, ''Well, I don't have anything against him." And
I said, "Well, goddamn it, you used to be good friends and work togethe
r, and
you understo od each other.
What's happened ? When was the last time you saw
. ?"
h im.
He said, "Oh, I see him all the time."
And I said, "When' s the last
time you had him over for dinner?"

He said, "Oh, a short time ago.

I don't

know exactly when."

So, I went over to the Economic Ministry and talked to
Vice Presiden t Tho; among other things, he said, "That stupid guy Diem doesn't

know how to run anything ."

An orderly was serving us tea in his office.
I
said "Does the orderly work for Diem?" He said, "I don't know." And I
said,

"He'll probably go over and report the way you're talking about him. How
can
Diem like you if you talk this way about him all of the time?" And he
said,
"Well, I don't really feel that way about him.
I haven't seen him in some
time."
I said, "I just talked to Diem.
He said he had you over for dinner
recently ."
years."

said,

So, I said.,

love to.''
out."

He

I

haven't

had

dinner with

him

''Would you have dinner with him?"

He said, "He's a man with a lot of problem s.

And I said, "That-a- boy."

for

a

year,

He said,

or

two

"Sure, I'd

I'd like to help him

So, I went back and saw Diem.

I told him,

"Tho hasn't seen you for a year for dinner. Why don't you call him right
now
and invite him tonight for dinner?"
So, Diem did.
And he had him run for
Vice Presiden t again.
This is the way a friend should act, to bring people
together in harmony to work together .
Tho was a good man.
him closely on the
was.

economy .

The American s liked him, those who worked with
He was a very sophisti cated guy.
He really

H~ was a financie r .

. He made the Ba My Ba beer that the American s used
to drink over there [ laughte r
and he loved mystery stories.
When I went
back, I used to take him mystery stories and he'd tell me all the things
the

J,

United States was doing wrong in Vietnam .

[ laughte r]

I'd go over, and I'd

say,

"Here are some new murder mysterie s for you, now tell me now why you
think we're being bad boys over here? You have a half hour to tell me."
And
he'd tell me.
Gibbons:

Did there ever come a time when you gave up on Diem?
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Lansdale:

No, there were times when I was disappointed in what he
was doing, but we were really such close friends that we could always talk
frankly to each other.

The last time I saw him was in 1961 when I went to
Vietnam with Taylor and Rostow on a mission for Kennedy. When I was trying to
talk to Diem, his brother Nhu came in, first time ever, and sat there with him
and answered all of my questions and I said:
your brother, the President.

"I didn't ask you.

Let him answer it."

beaten by his brother by that time.

I was asking

Diem looked sort of brow-

It was a very strange meeting.

I had

dinner with him -- just the two of us alone -- Diem and me, and I said, "I'm
worried that you rely so heavily on your brother for the key things that you
should be thinking about and you let him answer."
he said.

"Oh he knew the answers,"

I said, "Yes, but we've never talked that way before.

the two of us talking.

You're the head of the country.

It's usually

He isn't.

I know

he's been supplying you with information and intelligence but it is wrong to
rely too heavily on anyone else. You can listen to him and then make up your
own mind, but don't let him speak for you."

He said, ''Well, I didn't realize

I was doing that."
Gibbons:
Lansdale:

But did he change any after that?
I don't think so, no.

Maybe if I had stayed on in

Vietnam and had seen him frequently, it might have been different.
Gibbons:

Well, in the late summer of '63, when the United States
decided it really had to put the heat on, and then through until the coup,
were you involved?
Lansdale:
Gibbons:
Lansdale:

No.
.•. and how did you feel about what was going on?
I didn't know that anything was going on.

I was just telling you was

This .•. what

'61,

the fall of '61, and when I got back to
Washington I got mixed up with Cuban affairs, and then McNamara told me to
stay out of putting my two bits in on what was happening in Vietnam -- which I
was

doing all

of the

time in the Pentagon.

He said it was disturbing

everybody.

So, I was looking for other places to get involved, and I started
going down to South America. The Cubans were starting their activities down
there then, blowing up the oil rigs on Lake Maracaibo in Venezuela and were
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training people and creating guerrilla forces all over South America.

So, the

defense ministries down there started asking me to come down and visit, which
I did.

I wanted to get out to the Middle East, and the Israelies invited me,

but I

guess

Israel.

the U.S.

didn't want me to go there because I never got to

The only place they'd let me go was South America.

to keep me in the western hemisphere,

I

guess,

something of Washington's unhappiness with Diem.
was talking with Governor Harriman.

They were trying

by that time.

I

sensed

In the late summer of '63 I

He was asking me some questions about

brother Nhu and Diem, and he told me he was very surprised at my viewpoints on
things, I guess because I didn't want anyone to ki l l him [Diem], and my ideas
weren't very military.
Ha rvard.
him,

But I was begging him to find a place for Nhu up at

I remember he had John Kenneth Galbraith, a Harvard economist with

who had been Ambassador in India at the time.

breakfast with us over at Harriman's house.

Galbraith was ha v-ing

I was saying that Galbraith and

Harriman should get together and put up a group a t Harvard and invite Nhu over
from Vietnam to be a member there.
an intellectual.

I said, "Kick him upstairs.

im and give him a job the re.

Listen to

Tell him he's

He'd come, and Diem

And once he's away, then Diem will be a very different
person and be on his own and you won't have to worry so much about h.1m.

would let him go.

II

Ga lbraith took a very dim view of it.
guy .

And I said, "No, Nhu's a real smart

He's obnoxious like most of you intellectuals -- he sort of gets on my

nerves a little bit."

Galbraith was real mad at me for suggesting it, and I

couldn't help teasing him.
Gibbons:
Lansdale:

But it would have been one one way out for him.

What was Harriman's reaction?
Harriman liked it.

and I like ideas like this."

He s aid, "I like the way you think

I said, •~ell, Diem gave his father a death-bed

promise that he would take care of his youngest brother, Nhu.
Americans have come in and bluntly told him to get rid of Nhu.
father's wishes mean more to him.

He's a family man.

And now we
Well, his

Instead of that, if we

had gone in and said, 'We have a real good job for Nhu and want you to help us
convince him to go,' he'd do it.
brother, which it would be."
_really is.

You know, he'd tnin.k it was good for his

And I said, "And Nhu is a real intellectual.

He's a deep political student.

He

I don't agree with him on a lot of

things but that doesn't say that he doesn't have a lot on the ball, because he
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does. "

But we didn't do i t .
I could feel that somethin g was happenin g.
Then , I went over a nd talked to the assistan t s e cretary of State for the Far
East. Harriman told me to se e him -- he ' s teaching up at Columbia now. ~~\
Gibbons:
Lansnale :

~l

Hi lsman?
Hilsman .

Roger Hilsman .

Roger kept talking about h i s
forthcom ing t r i p to Austral ia, and I said, "No , Harri man wants me to talk
about Vietnam to you. You must be about to do somethin g. Tell me what it is,
so I ' l l know, and maybe I can help you, come up with some ideas for you. " And
h e'd keep going back to Austral ia. He wo uldn' t t alk about Vi e tnam at a ll. I
wen t in and saw McNamara and he must have hinted at forthcom ing changes in
Saigon.

I r emember s aying , "Don't fo rge t there's a consti tution there. Keep
it alive. Don't go monkeyin g around trying to overcome the will of the pe ople
to make some new idea work.
presiden t t here, " and so on.

And don't forget there's a constitu tional vice
I remember telling him that. So , I was getting

hints of some t hing, but no t the facts.
I was retired the end of October,
1963, which was t he f i r st of Novembe r i n Sa i gon.
My f r iends in the press
s tarted calling me that night, the first time I was home after retiring , a nd
they were very surprise d I was home and not out i n Vie tnam . I said , ''Why?"
and they said, ''We have a flash from Saigon tha t t here ' s a revo l t against Diem
there. They're trying to overthro w him. The armed forces are taking over and
we thought you ' d be out there, that maybe you were running it or somethin g . "
And I said, "No.

I didn't even know about it . "

Gibbons:

Do you remember what McNamara ' s reaction was when you were

talking to him?
Lansdale :

He listened but he never listened fully. [laughte r] I
talked to him a number of · times about Vietnam and I never felt that he was
paying full attentio n to me . I remember when he was trying to compute rize the
war and he called me in one day.
He had a long list of entries for a
compute r, includin g the body count type of stuff, enemy casualti es. He had
written them out in a hard - lead pencil, I remembe r, on graph paper.
And I
said, "Your list i s incompl ete . You've left out the most importan t factor of
all." He said, "What is it? " I said , "Well, it's the human factor. You can
put it down as the X fa ctor. "

So , he wrote down in pencil, "X factor."

He

v-"I~
')
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said,

"What

does

it

consist

battlefield really feel;

which side

they're for at the moment.
war decided."

of?"

I

said,

"What

they want

the people out on the

to see win and which side

That's the only way you're going to ever have this

And he said, "Tell me how to put it in?"

I said, "I don't

think any Americans out there at the moment can report this to you." He said,
"Oh, well," and he got out an eraser to erase it.
I said, "No, leave it
there."
Then I took about a week trying to figure how you get answers on
that,

which

I

did

evaluation system.

finally.

They

later used

the

ideas

for

the hamlet

Mine was a way to get our troops to report when they went

in villages, whether the people, the kids, were smiling or present -- a whole
bunch of facts -- a very complicated type of evaluation. But at the time I
was pleading with McNamara not to codify a war and then believe what the
figures were telling him.

I said , "You 're going to fool yourself if you get

all of these figures added up because they won't tell you how we're doing in
this war."
Gibbons:

What was his reaction to that?

Lansdale:
[laughter]

He

asked

me

to

please

not

bother

him

anymore.

He used to say, "Thank you, I've got something else to do now."

No, I could seldom talk to him.

When he was first made Secretary of Defense

-- the first day in office -- I was just back from a trip to Vietnam.
He
asked me to please come in and brief him. I was down in my office nearby. I
had a lot of Viet Cong weapons, punji stakes, and so on, that I'd collected in
Vietnam to get the Special Forces to start a Fort Bragg museum of guerrilla
weapons
and they still had Vietnamese mud on them, rusty and dirty. They
were picked up from the battle field. So, I tucked all of these under my arm
and went to his office.

He had told me on the phone that I had five minutes

to give him a briefing on Vietnam.

I went in and he was sitting at his desk
and I put all of these dirty weapons down -- crude looking, and including
those big spikes that they had as punji stakes with dried blood and mud on
them -- I put them on this beautiful mahogony desk -- I just dumped them on
that.
I said, "The enemy in Vietnam use these weapons -- and they were just
using them just a little bit ago before I got them.
or wear sandals.
them.

Many of them are barefoot

They wear black pajamas, usually, with tatters or holes in

I don't think you'd recognize any of them as soldiers, but they think
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of themselv es that way.

The people that are fighting them, on our side,
being supplied with our weapons and uniforms and good shoes and all of
best that we have; and we' re training them.
Yet, the enemy is licking
side," I said. "Always keep in mind about Vietnam , that the struggle goes

are
the
our

far
beyond the materia l things of life, It doesn't take weapons and uniforms and
lots of food to win.
It takes somethin g else, ideas and ideals, and these
guys are using that somethin g else.
Let's at least learn that lesson."
Somehow, I found him very hard to talk to. Watchin g his face as I talked, I
got the feeling that he didn't understa nd me.
found him very hard to talk to.
Gibbons:
for what happene d.

Too unconve ntional.

Somehow, I

You said earlier that he bears a very heavy respons ibility
Could you explain that?

Lansdale :

We used to call it his war -- McNamara's war -- even the
troops out in Vietnam used to call it that.
And all of a sudden he wasn't
Secretar y of Defense anymore , and then it became somebody else's war, and he
got out of the whole thing.
was going on in Vietnam .

But origina lly he felt very strongly about what
He used to make trips out there all of the time. He

used to confer with the Preside nt, the Chiefs in the Pentagon , and argue for
his Vietnam budget up on the Hill.
He was the Admini stration 's leader on
Vietnam affairs.
Perhaps I was too critica l of the big U.S. bureauc ratic
buildup in Vietnam. He took me off of reportin g to him or saying anything to
him about it by Fall, 1961,
Gibbons:
Lansdale :

That's the point at which he took you off?

Pretty much, yes. I think I
there.
Maybe the Chiefs had asked him to keep
felt that I was very unconve ntional.
I recall
Wheeler , when he was Chief of Staff of the Army,

was probably making waves in
me quiet.
I know that they
that one time General Buzz
asked if I would take one of

his rambun~ tious colonels on my OSD staff [laughte r] for a time and protect
him from being annihila ted by his own staff. Wheeler thought very highly of
this colonel who was very, very outspoke n on things, They brought him back to
the U.S. from Vietnam and he told Kennedy that things weren't going well there
to the great embarras sment of the Army.
Gibbons:

Is it John Paul Vann you're talking about?

f

r
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Lansdale :

Yes.

I liked Vann.

He was very outspoke n, but he had a
big heart. He told me how he despised Huynh Van Cao, who was a friend of mine
to whom Vann had been assigned as an advisor , for the way Cao fought the
enemy, and that it was a stupid way he was fighting . I had to agree that it
was a lousy way to fight.

Later, when Diem was overthro wn, Cao got it; he had
been so close to Diem that the other generals gave him a very bad time, and
kicked him out of his job. Cao had a very large family, many children . Vann
was living in Colorado at the time. He took all of his savings from the bank
and got it over to Vietnam and loaned it to Cao to help him. Vann was deeply,
emotion ally committe d to Vietnam and the Vietnam ese people. I told the Army
the same thing. I said, "You should listen to him. I think he's telling the
truth on these things. He believes it truly," which he did.
Gibbons:

Well, he must have been a very independ ent kind of a guy.

Lansdale :

He was, very, very much so, likeable , though, with it
all. We wound up close friends, despite all that. He didn't believe some of
the things that I said. He used to tell me as much. And I said, "That's all
right."
Gibbons:

Back to the question of the coup.
was your reaction to what we did?

Were you shocked?

What

Lansdale :

I thought it was a terrible , stupid thing. First of all,
Diem was a friend of mine, so it came as a persona l shock when he was
killed.
Secondly , the action itself didn't make military sense to me.
We
divided our forces in the face of the enemy -- a military "no-no."
South
Vietnam was up against a very aggress ive, smart, and imagina tive enemy who was
fighting the war from a politica l basis. And on our side, we paid too little
attentio l) to the politica l .basis which we needed to wage a war. By killing
Diem, we split our politica l side at least in two if not more parts, and doing
that in the face of the enemy who would take advantag e of it right away. I
felt we were too weak to play around that way, and I thought it was the worst
thing that we ever did.
I still can't understa nd anybody 's thinking on
that. And the enemy did take advantag e of it right away. I'm sure that some
place along the line we'll find all of the ways that they did. They became
much

stronge r,

and

started

going

on

towards

winning

the

war

from

that

f

.
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moment.

I think we should never have done it.

We destroyed the Vietnamese

Constitution,

not we, but the people we were working with, threw it in the

waste basket.

The governmental structure was destroyed -- the province chiefs

and the district chiefs and so forth, the whole structure went down .

And from

then on, as they kept on having more and more coups and new generals would
take over, they'd destroy the whole structure of government again, all of the
province chiefs and so forth. There were always people who didn't quite know
their jobs throughout the country, and we were thinking all of the time that
they were all solid and held together, but they weren ' t people to do that.
And we didn't realize it.
ever figured

out

that

Even today I don't think any of the historians have
it happened

that

way,

but we destroyed

the whole

government side of the social structure in one fell-blow.
Gibbons:
Lansdale:

How could we have done something like that?
I

don't know.

I

know that some things had gone wrong,

but why we didn't try constructive ways of repairing damage that we'd see -it's far more rational to talk people into correcting mistakes than to shoot
them and thus get them out of the way.
Gibbons:
power.

1/3/83

Fulbright wrote

a

book about

Was this an aspect of that?
Lansdale:

AGB

Well,

Might have been.

Might have been.

the arrogance

of

